In 1970, Colonel "Bull" Simons found that during night live-fire rehearsals for the Son Tay Raid, "even his best shooters were getting only about 25 percent of the rounds fired at 50 meters into torso-size targets which simulated enemy soldiers standing up in a foxhole."¹ He immediately purchased an Armalite sight and the Singlepoint Nite Sight, which enabled every M-16 shooter to put every round into an E-type silhouette out to 50 meters. The only problem the shooters experienced was finding a proper mounting bracket for the sight; the quick fix was "a generous use of black electrician's tape," something that most squad leaders still have to deal with today in spite of all our technological advancements.

This article outlines some of the TTP employed during a company air assault RAID, shares the major TTP as a result of this exercise, and discusses the training and equipment required to conduct operations totally in the infrared (IR) spectrum. Much of what will be outlined here is already standing operating procedure in some infantry units that have been aggressively training to "own the night." We, as an Army, and the infantry in particular, have clearly made great strides in mastering night operations, but we still have much to do.

Since the l 970s, the individual soldier's ability to identify, acquire and accurately engage targets at night with individual and crew-served weapons has dramatically increased. Recently, 1st Ranger Battalion conducted three company air assault raids with the terminal training objective to execute the raid at night under live-fire conditions in a "near total" IR spectrum. Close Quarter Battle (CQB) flashlights (sure-lights or TAC lights) mounted on individual weapons for room clearing were the only overt lights used. All other markings (friendly forces, breach points, cleared bunkers/buildings/rooms), acquisition/ illumination of targets, EPW searches and casualty evacuation operations were accomplished using night-vision devices with the aid of IR sources. Every weapon system organic to the Ranger rifle company and the special operations helicopter support unit was employed, to include the M l 6A2 and M4 carbines; M203 Grenade Launcher; M249 SAW; M240G Machine Gun; Shotgun; 84-mm Ranger Anti-Armor Weapon System (RAAWS or Carl Gustaf); M24 and .50-Caliber Sniper Rifles; 60-mm Mortar; M72A2 LAW; AT-4; Ml 8A1 Claymore Mine; and the Bangalore Torpedo. Supporting attack helicopters employed 2.75-inch rockets, 30-mm, and the 7.62-mm mini-gun. Every Ranger had night-vision goggles (NVG) (PVS-7A or 7B) and an aiming/pointing device and/or night-vision scope for his weapon. Since knocking out several bunkers in the vicinity of the breach points was a critical task, leaders placed emphasis on identifying, acquiring and accurately engaging these targets with the LAW, AT-4 and RAAWS. Several types of devices were used by leaders to designate/illuminate targets for the support and assault elements, as well as the attack helicopters.

THE RAID

The scenario for the raid involved an enemy terrorist training camp comprised of 30 trainees and 12 cadre spread throughout nine plywood buildings (See Figure l). They were equipped with small arms and had one .50-caliber heavy machine gun employed in an anti-aircraft role near the center of the camp. The enemy did not possess night-vision devices or chemical weapons. The camp was surrounded by triple-standard concertina wire and eight bunkers. The cadre had a compound inside the camp that was separated from the trainees by a double cyclone fence. Enemy vehicles were stored in a motor pool adjacent to the camp. Upon attack, the enemy was expected to defend the camp until overwhelmed. During the time of the attack, the illumination was zero percent.

The company mission was to destroy the enemy terrorist camp to prevent enemy forces from reinforcing another critical target within the battalion's area of operations.

The concept was divided into three phases: Phase I (Marshall and Deploy); Phase II (Assault); and Phase III (Exfiltration).

Phase I (Marshall and Deploy) began with the marshalling of the Air Assault Task Force (AATF) and ended with the beginning of pre-assault fires on the objective. The airlift package included three USAF medium lift helicopters, four Chinook medium lift and four Army Blackhawk helicopters, supported by two light and two medium attack helicopters. The task force was controlled by the AATF Commander (battalion C² element) in a Chinook with a C² console.

Phase II (Assault) began at H-3 minutes with the pre-assault fires from attack helicopters on key targets inside the objective---the .50-cal position, bunkers 4-6, and building 10. At H-Hour, the support force on three USAF helicopters, consisting of the company's weapons platoon with two 60-mm mortars, two RAAWS, seven M240G machine guns, two snipers armed with an M24 and .50-cal Barrett, and the company alternate command post (ACP) landed approximately 300 meters from the objective at HLZ SEAGULL and immediately suppressed the objective area until the arrival of the assault force. The support element leader used the ground commander's pointer (GCP) and a Maxibeam flood light with IR filter to illuminate the objective area and designate key targets (bunkers and buildings) for the RAAWS and M24OGs. This enabled all sections on the SBF position to quickly acquire their targets and adjust their fire to achieve accurate suppressive fire. The RAAWS and M240G machine gunners used the Litton M937 scope or PVS-7B with an AIM-1 aiming device to engage targets out to 400 meters. The assault force in four Blackhawks and four Chinook helicopters landed at HLZ VULTURE, 150 meters to the east of the objective and to the south of the SBF position, at H+4 and H+5 minutes respectively. As the Blackhawk helicopters approached HLZ Vulture, their door gunners engaged bunkers 5 and 6 and buildings 23 and 24.

The assault force consisted of three rifle platoons, two M240G machine-guns, and one RAAWS, under the control of the company CP. The assault element was deployed with 1st and 2d platoons abreast and 3d platoon back as the initial company reserve. The plan called for 1st and 2d platoons each to seize breach points vicinity bunkers 5 and 6, clear bunkers 4, 5, 6, and 7; then in sequence, clear buildings 23, 24, 22, 21, and 20 (see Figure 1). Once building 20 and bunker 7 were cleared, 3d platoon would pass through 1st platoon, breach the fence on the east side of building 12, then clear buildings 12, 11, 10 in sequence while being supported by 2d platoon. While assault forces would move to the buildings using night observation devices once stacked outside buildings, the clearing team would flip up their PVS-7B and clear the rooms/building using "white light" flashlights mounted on their individual weapon.

OBJECTIVE PANTHER

Initially, the assault force achieved suppressive fire on the objective and again engaged bunkers 4-6 at a range of approximately 100 meters with two (2) AT-4s, one with a PVS-4 and the other gunner using a PVS-7B and PAQ-4C, and one RAAWS.

Once the Company Commander was satisfied the breach points were isolated and the objective was being suppressed, the 1st and 2d platoons launched two breach teams which conducted fire and movement to two breach points on the triple-standard concertina obstacle and at each point emplaced two sections of a Bangalore torpedo primed with a 3-minute nonelectrical firing system. The right flanks of the breach teams were marked with either an IR chemlight or a Phoenix IR beacon so the attack helicopters and SBF position, which were still suppressing the bunkers near the breach site, could identify the most forward friendly elements. Prior to reaching the breach point, the signal was given for the SBF element to shift fires, moving the left limit of the SBF suppressive fires to building 23. With bangalores emplaced, time fuses burning, the breach teams bounded back 100 meters to the assault element position and the SBF element shifted back on the bunkers 5 and 6. Once the bangalores blow, the breach teams immediately bound back up to clear and mark the breach with IR chemlights. They shift the SBF element back to building 23, and knock out bunkers 5 and 6. With the movement through the breach point, the next signal is given to once again shift the SBF element to building 12. With the breach points seized and direct fire suppression on buildings 20 through 24 and attack helicopters isolating and suppressing buildings 10 through 12, 1st platoon launched a squad to clear building 23. With building 23 cleared, the SBF element fires are lifted and they assume responsibility to prevent enemy withdrawal to the north. As each building was marked cleared with an IR chemlight, another squad launched to continue clearing a building. With building 20 cleared and bunker 7 knocked out, 3d platoon becomes the main effort and was passed through to breach and seize their objective (buildings 10 - 12). Prior to executing the breach, bunker 3 was engaged from approximately 75 meters with an M72A2 LAW. The gunner wore a PVS-7B and mounted an AIM-1 aiming laser on the LAW. The attack helicopters responded to calls for fire from forward observers, marked with it strobes, to engage targets on and around the objective.

Phase III (Exfiltration) began once the assault force had secured the objective and the company began to consolidate and reorganize. As searches were being conducted with IR lights, several enemy vehicles were engaged approximately 100 meters west of the objective with four M72A2 LAWs with either the PVS-4 or AIM-1 aiming laser. Crucial to the success of this phase was the treatment, triage and immediate extraction of friendly casualties. O/Cs identified between 12-15 casualties to fully exercise the CSS system within the company. Once the casualties were evacuated, the assault force withdrew from the objective back to HLZ VULTURE while the support element overwatched. Following the familiar "fire in the hole" and destruction of captured enemy weapons and equipment, helicopters returned to pick up the assault force. The support element was recovered two minutes later under the overwatch of the attack helicopters. The entire operation, even with such intensive casualty play and total darkness, lasted about 45 minutes.

PREPARATION

Many infantry units occasionally perform night air assaults (raid or attack) under live-fire conditions, but few can achieve the level of proficiency necessary to sustain a "trained" status; fewer can do the mission in a "near total" IR spectrum. There are two essential components inherent in achieving a "T" status in the IR spectrum. First, a unit must have the equipment necessary to do the job. Simply put, a unit cannot operate completely in the IR spectrum unless every soldier has NVG mounted on his head. Furthermore, the NVG are of little value to a shooter without an aiming device. Second, the unit must conduct extensive trainup and rehearsals. The trainup process is no different than training for any other mission or task. It must be gradual and pass through the crawl, walk, run stages as outlined in FM 25-101, Battle-Focused Training. It must address the individual, leader and collective tasks that support the terminal training objective as specified in ARTEPs 7-8 and 7-10 MTP. Although the training principles are no different than for other missions, trainup for the night live-fire air assault raid in the IR spectrum presents very unique challenges to overcome - challenges that face infantry leaders from fire team to battalion level.

NIGHT-VISION EQUIPMENT

While Rangers are resourced differently than conventional infantry units, most of the equipment is the same. Often Rangers receive the latest weapons and equipment in the Army inventory, such as the M4 Carbine that is replacing the M l 6A2; the M240G replaced the battalion M60 Machine Gun; the RAAWS replaced the Dragon; and the Litton M845 and 937 night-vision scopes augment the PVS-4s. With new equipment comes new challenges and the responsibility to develop TTP for its use. The Ranger company is able to outfit every Ranger with NVG, scope and/or aiming laser. As mentioned, Rangers still use the PVS-7A, PVS-4S, PAQ-As and the PVS-7Bs, Littons, PAO-4Cs, and the AIM-1. Like other units, Rangers are waiting for better equipment--replace PVS-7As with PVS-7D, maintaining what we have, and relying on NCOs and their ingenuity to accomplish any mission they are given. Rangers still rely on "a generous use of black electrician's tape" now and then. To assist in fielding new night-vision equipment and developing the innovations for employing what is already in the inventory, 1st Ranger Battalion formed a night-vision committee at the battalion level that is comprised of several NCOs, platoon leaders, the HHC Commander (the Battalion Force Modernization Officer), and the Battalion Commander. Their efforts have helped to establish an SOP that delineates who carries which NVG goggles. The following is a list of equipment and TTPs used to operate in the IR spectrum:

NVG: Every soldier on the battlefield, whether he has a night-vision sight mounted on his weapon or not, must have NVG to operate in the IR spectrum. Without them, he is severely handicapped during movement, resulting in a loss of control for the unit and a diminished ability to acquire the enemy. The PVS-7B with the flipup head mount is considerably better than its predecessor, the PVS-7A. The Generation III tube in the PVS-7B provides greatly increased clarity that enables the soldier to better identify and acquire targets. Once fielded, the PVS-7D will be even better. The flipup head mount allows the soldier to quickly remove the goggles before entering a lighted room. The compass that comes with the PVS-7B enhances navigating and maintaining orientation. However, units will find that due to the metal in the new flipup mount, the compass is off approximately 15 degrees! Another improvement on the PVS-7B is the IR intensifier tube that can be placed over the IR source on the goggle. This enables the soldier to focus the IR from a "flood" to a "spot light," thus changing the need for IR intensity based upon terrain (movement through woods versus a builtup area). While the use of white light is a preferred technique for room clearing, when encountering large open areas (such as hangers, airport terminals, etc.) the use of the IR source on the goggle may be the best option to illuminate the area while clearing. The only problems encountered with the PVS-7B is the need to use the eye cups around helicopters, the limited range of head motion when worn along with Ranger Body Armor (RBA), and an occasional "black-out" during IMT due to a loose switch.

AIMING DEVICES/POINTERS/ILLUMINATORS: The best set of NVGs will not do a shooter any good without an aiming laser, such as the PAQ-4A, PAQ-4C, or AIM-1 that is zeroed to his weapon. The PAQ-4C is much better than the PAQ-4A as the laser is stronger, eye-safe, and not intermittent. Mounting the PAQ-4C on the M4 has been one of our greatest challenges due to a shortage of mounting brackets. Although noted as an additional authorized item in the PAQ-4C TM, the M4 mounting bracket has yet to be available in mass quantities. Thanks to NCO ingenuity and resourcefulness, we have gone from electrician's tape, to modified Aimpoint mounts, to finding a supplier. The bottom line is that every Ranger armed with an M16A2, M4, M203, or M249 SAW has a PAQ-4A, PAQ-4C, or AIM-1 laser. All M240G machine guns and RAAWS can use the AIM-1, but the challenge of a proper mounting bracket still remains. The companies use the AIM-1 primarily for squad leaders, the .50 Caliber, M240G Machine guns, and AT systems due to its greater range and intensity. The AIM-1 on high power stands out on the battlefield and is easily distinguishable among the other lasers. Platoon leaders and forward observers use the hand-held LPL-30, Laser Target Designator, to mark targets for attack helicopters, machine guns, snipers and anti-tank systems. Leaders will usually tape the LPL-30 on top of their PVS-7 to keep their hands free. Another device used to direct or illuminate a target is the "Maxibeam" search light. The Maxibeam is a light-weight hand-held, battery-operated IR or white light search light with several million candle power. Its beam can be narrowed or broadened to illuminate small targets, such as a bunker or breach point, or large areas, such as a portion of the objective. Rangers have used the Maxibeam with great success from the support element, particularly on nights with limited illumination. Other IR aimer/pointer/illuminators we have been testing are the Ground Commander's Pointer - Infrared (GCP-lA, GCP-2) and the IR target pointer/illuminator/aiming laser (ITPIAL) made by the Night-Vision Equipment Company. They have proven very effective in augmenting and, in some cases, replacing the use of the Maxibeam lights. They are much lighter, eye safe at low power, and, in the case of the GCP-2 and ITPIAL, can be mounted on a weapon.

NIGHT-VISION SCOPES: Rangers have generally progressed from the PVS-4 to the Litton M845 and M937. Normally, the SAW gunner mounts the M845 and the M240G machine gunner and the RAAWS gunner mount the M937 on their weapon systems. Rangers still use the PVS-4 for the LAW and AT-4 due to the availability of scopes and mounts. A few months ago the battalion received the Advanced Combat Optical Gunsight (ACOG) scope, one for each rifle fire team leader. The ACOG is an outstanding small 4x scope for daylight operations, but works well at night provided there is some illumination. The ACOG augments the battalion's stock of Aimpoint l000s and is normally mounted on the fire team leader's M4. The battalion recently tested a scope from Computing Devices of Canada (CDC) called the Computerized Laser-Assisted Sight System (CLASS) and was very pleased with the results and potential application to the MK19, M2 and RAAWS. The CLASS enabled Rangers to hit targets out to l000m with a near first-round hit using the MK19; the results were equally impressive with the RAAWS and M2.

MARKINGS: Each Ranger was marked with a two-inch strip of Glint tape on his arm and a one-inch square on his helmet. Glint tape is reflective to IR sources shined on it. All cleared breach points, buildings and bunkers were marked with either IR chemlights, or Phoenix beacons, as was the Casualty Collection Point (CCP). We also used IR strobe lights or Phoenix beacons to identify the flanks of assaulting elements. Also LZ/PZs were marked with either a strobe or swinging IR chemlight. Marking using only IR sources has advantages and disadvantages. The advantage is that an enemy without night-vision devices will have a lot of trouble identifying the friendly locations and actions. The disadvantage is that friendly forces can get confused trying to navigate through an objective that is marked all in the same color and contains several blinking IR lights. Supporting attack helicopters also can have a hard time identifying the source of a laser - "is that a Phoenix beacon or an IR strobe light?"

CQB LIGHTS (SURE-LIGHT/TAC LIGHT): Close Quarter Battle lights mounted on individual weapon systems are the one exception to operating in total darkness. Although these lights come with IR filters, Ranger experience indicates that "white light clearing: of buildings is generally the preferred method. It increases peripheral vision, enhances target acquisition and control, and increases the speed of the room-clearing team. The obvious field expedient flashlight taped to the handguard is a must for those without CQB lights. However, the use of "white light," even in room-clearing operations, must be METT-T-dependent. When clearing large open areas, the use of CQB lights, without IR filter, is not the preferred technique. Use of the CQB light with IR filter also enhances EPW search operations.

TRAINUP

The battalion takes great pride in the professional abilities of their NCOs, particularly in the initiative, dedication and drive of the young team and squad leaders. These junior NCOs are trainers who understand and enforce the highest standards. They will spend whatever time is necessary to ensure that their team or squad is mentally and physically prepared to accomplish the Ranger mission. It is not uncommon to see a Ranger fire team or squad practicing CQB in the battalion area, battle drills on the PT field, or gathered around a chalkboard during some downtime in garrison. In the field, companies try to spend 75 percent of their time training at the squad/platoon level. This is common throughout the Ranger Regiment and reflects the core belief that if a battalion has great squads, then it has great platoons and great companies.

LEADER TRAINING

Recognizing the crucial role of the junior NCO in the trainup process for the night live-fire air assault raid in the IR spectrum is the first step in establishing the training program. Whether it is understanding the capabilities and limitations of weapons and night-vision devices, marksmanship, battle drills or CQB, the junior NCO must be technically and tactically proficient, have time to train his team or squad, and most of all, be trusted.

Leader training for this mission can take the form of NCOPD/OPDs or Train The Trainer (TTT) classes. To gain and maintain proficiency in CQB, many Ranger leaders attend the JFKSWC Special Operations Training (SOT) course at Fort Bragg, NC, providing a schooled training base of NCOs from which to draw. Ranger leaders have also attended specialized demolitions courses to learn nonstandard methods of entering buildings. To build upon that base, the Battalion has conducted NCOPD/OPDs at ranges to share the latest techniques in reflexive firing/advanced marksmanship techniques. Recently, the platoon leaders spent a day at Fort Stewart's shoothouse live-firing different scenarios and increasing their proficiency in CQB. The platoon leaders have also increased their general night fighting capability and understanding of battle drills by conducting the Squad Attack Drill (LFX). These leader training techniques can also be applied to other battle drills of the air assault raid such as breach a wire obstacle, enter/clear a trench line, knock out a bunker, and support by fire exercises.

INDIVIDUAL TRAINING

Like the leader tasks, most of the specific individual training tasks that are requisite to conducting the mission are clearly defined in ARTEPs 7-8 and 7-10 MTP. What is not so apparent is the soldier's proficiency and familiarity with his weapon/night-vision device system. It entails more than just engaging targets with the M16 and PVS-4/Litton, or the PVS-7 and the PAQ-4/AIM-1. The soldier and his weapon/night-vision device system must become one. He must be able to zero the PAQ-4/AIM-1, engage targets out to 300 meters as well as he can during the day, reduce stoppages in his weapon, and perform IMT as a member of a fire team. Advance marksmanship training, day and night, is key to success and individual proficiency is reflexive firing. Although these tasks are low overhead and nonresource intensive, they are vitally important before a team or squad can progress to collective training.

COLLECTIVE TRAINING

As mentioned earlier, Rangers try to focus 75 percent of the training time available at the squad/platoon level. In preparation for the night air assault raid, companies use a "building-block approach" to the collective trainup once the chain of command is satisfied that leaders and individual Rangers are proficient at their tasks. For the scenario described earlier, the companies broke down the collective training into four separate tasks/drills that are normally done concurrently the week prior to the company mission: support by fire exercise, breach wire obstacle and knock out a bunker, squad/platoon attack, and enter building/clear room (CQB). The task, conditions and standards for these drills are found in ARTEP 7-8 MTP, with the exception of CQB. The Ranger Regiment uses its own Regimental Training Circular 350-2 (CQB POI) for this drill.

SUPPORT BY FIRE EXERCISE: Generally, this exercise is conducted day and night immediately following zero and qualification of our machine gun crews. Companies first focus on gun crew proficiency through basic crew drill, then transition to the MG squad, which consists of three M240G Machine guns teams, three men per team, and a squad leader who is normally the senior SSG in the platoon. The squad must be able to work in absolute harmony with each other. The MG squad leader is the leader who designates targets and directs the fire of the squad to ensure total coverage of assigned sectors and minimal lulls in fire. He also maintains the ability to cease the squad's fire immediately upon command. Companies will occasionally, as they did for this exercise, incorporate mortars, snipers and the AT sections into the support by fire exercise.

BREACH WIRE OBSTACLE/KNOCK OUT A BUNKER: These drills are normally conducted using blank ammunition and live demolitions. Depending on the time that has elapsed since a unit's last demolitions training, platoons may cover some of the basic tasks involved in priming electrical and nonelectrical demolitions prior to starting the breach drill. On occasion these drills are also part of a platoon attack, day/night LFX, or battle drill STX lane. Ranger companies generally plan to breach triple-standard concertina and cyclone fence as these wire obstacles are what they expect to encounter in third-world nations. The battalion has developed a field expedient Bangalore Torpedo called a "Brashier Breach," named after one of their lSGs, which has a minimum safe distance of 50 feet, compared to 300 meters required with the Army's Bangalore Torpedo or 100 meters with two sections and troops in a defilade position. Although this field expedient method has not yet been approved, the initial test results are very promising. Until the battalion receives approval, they will continue to use two sections of the Bangalore Torpedo, laid diagonally beneath triple-standard concertina. If properly laid, it will blast a hole large enough for a truck to drive through. The cyclone fence usually requires a ladder charge, which is simply several strips of C4 taped to "det" cord and hung vertically on the fence. Priming with electrical or nonelectrical blasting caps each has its advantages and disadvantages. Normally, Rangers prefer nonelectrical priming due to the virtual certainty of detonation.

SQUAD/PLATOON ATTACK: The need to maintain basic proficiency in the squad/platoon attack battle drill as outlined in FM 7-8 is essential in everything Rangers do. It is a battle drill that cuts across nearly every task on the battalion and company METL. The battalion spends a considerable amount of time working this drill day and night, under live-fire conditions. Companies usually conduct the drill about every six to eight weeks and always before a company live-fire raid or attack. Supporting tasks of the drill are varied to keep the Rangers focused. Sometimes companies incorporate "knock out a bunker" or simply "assault." Sometimes they add machine guns, AT or the mortars in support of the platoon. The battalion continues to experiment with new techniques to keep the training innovative and challenging, and improve their ability to "own the night." This drill is the most important drill to the infantry; it is our bread and butter. A unit must be able to conduct the squad attack at night as well as they can during the day before they attempt to do the platoon attack drill, or progress to the company night live-fire air assault raid in the IR spectrum.

ENTER BUILDING/CLEAR A ROOM (CQB): The days of throwing a hand grenade into a room and then rushing in and hosing the place down with automatic weapons fire went out with the Berlin Wall. Furthermore, it is a waste of ammunition that may not be resupplied in a timely manner. Soldiers must avoid opening locked doors with SAWs and Ml6s. These outdated techniques are the recipe for fratricide and the killing of innocent people. The restrictive ROE that U.S. forces encountered in Panama, Somalia and Haiti, and will certainly be encountered in future conflicts, does not allow for indiscriminate fires. To adhere to restrictive ROE while fighting in a builtup area, two things are required: training and discipline. Instilling the discipline of when and when not to shoot is a result of quality CQB training. Like the squad attack battle drill, Rangers try to execute this drill up to the squad level every six to eight weeks. The training starts with reflexive firing/advanced marksmanship training, taught by the junior NCOs. This takes a full day and night to execute to standard. Once the chain of command is satisfied with the individual level of proficiency, four-man teams practice "single-team, single-room," then "single-team, multiple-room" scenarios. The Ranger goal is always "multiple-team, multiple-room," day and night, live-fire. The battalion recently began using "blue-tip" ammunition with the M4/M16 and M249. The "blue-tip" ammunition is a low-velocity 5.56-mm round that disintegrates upon impact. It must be used with "bullet traps" (plywood sheets with foam padding in between) and requires the use of a special bolt. This new ammunition allows units to conduct live-fire exercises in a MOUT site not designed for LFXs. Conducting CQB to standard requires a lot of time and is a very perishable skill. While Rangers are initially trained as the number l, 2, 3, or 4 man in a clearing team, dependent on their duty position in the squad, everyone must cross-train so they can do any job in the team. This requires a lot of drills and time to execute to standard.

SUMMARY OF TACTICS, TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES

1. NVD proficiency is the first step towards being able to operate in the IR spectrum. Leaders and soldiers must be fully trained on their equipment and know its capabilities and limitations. The best set of NVG are of little use to a shooter who does not have, or has not learned to zero his, PAQ-4/AIM- 1. In the recent past, the 1st Ranger Battalion did not have enough PVS-7s to outfit every Ranger and were forced to task-organize night-vision equipment within the company so squads and platoons could train to standard at night. This is not unrealistic as a commander could weight his main effort prior to a fight by giving one element the majority of night-vision devices in the company. Maximize the use of available night-vision equipment to employ all weapons, such as the M72A2 LAW and AT-4. The PVS-4 needs to be replaced with a scope that maximizes the capability of the M249 and M240G/M60 machine guns. Currently, a unit is better off mounting a PAQ-4C on these weapons and having the soldier wear a PVS-7B.

2. Light discipline has an entirely new meaning. Rangers have found that there is a point of diminishing returns as it relates to the quantity of IR lights and lasers. Like most operations, SOPs are key to what will be used and by whom. At the same time one must carefully assess the enemy's night-vision capability. Clearly the covert IR marking of breach points and friendly elements should become standing operating procedures.

3. Close Quarter Battle (CQB) techniques work. Unique to special operations forces, CQB works extremely well. However, there is nothing secret about it and every rifle squad, given the training time, could use these techniques. Current Army doctrine has made the indiscriminate tossing of hand grenades and firing on burst as a soldier enters a room dependent upon ROE, but it still has flaws. Rangers "stack" a team outside a door or desired point of entry, use a shotgun to bust any lock or a demolitions charge to breach a wall, then flow into the room as a team. Grenades are used by exception, dependent upon ROE and construction of the building. Rangers never send one man in alone as advocated in some of the latest manuals on the subject. Once in the room, under most conditions, Rangers use white light to clear as it works much better than IR.

4. The squad/platoon attack is the fundamental battle drill on which the infantry is built. This drill is the one collective task that should be performed if there is no time to do anything else. From it, the infantry derives virtually every other task necessary to perform offensive operations. 1st Ranger Battalion has had tremendous success in maintaining proficiency in all of their offensive METL tasks and increasing the individual and collective proficiency of fighting at night by simply focusing on the squad/platoon attack battle drill and CQB with a training frequency of every six to eight weeks.

5. Develop unit SOPs to "own the night." The command and control challenges presented in the IR spectrum require units to establish SOPs that incorporate the technological advances the Army is making. These SOPs must be thoroughly wargammed and tested, then updated as new equipment is fielded.

6. Consider organizing a unit nightfighting committee at company and battalion levels. The 1st Ranger Battalion night-fighting committee provides a forum which allows the junior NCOs and platoon leaders to demonstrate the latest innovations and share their experiences and lessons learned. They developed a "Night-Vision Device Battle Roster" for the battalion that depicts which duty position uses which night-vision device. As new equipment is fielded, they provide recommendations to the commander on their disposition and distribution.

7. IR Marking of LZ / PZ. A swinging IR chemlight works best for marking LZ/PZs when using numerous IR sources on the battlefield. It is a source that is easily identifiable by aviators and distinguishable from other sources that may be employed.

CONCLUSION

Although this article outlined many of the TTP 1st Ranger Battalion learned in its progression to operate completely within the IR spectrum, it is but one unit's experience. Force XXI envisions every infantry unit - light, mechanized, airborne, air assault and Ranger - outfitted to operate in the total IR spectrum. However, being outfitted correctly is just a part of the picture. We, as a total infantry, must share the information we learn during training - the TTP, capabilities and limitations of current and new equipment - and apply it to future night battles. As the Army receives new night-vision equipment, commanders must take the time to field it correctly; carefully analyzing which duty positions need which night-vision devices. The individual soldier, his weapon and night-vision device must become one; the Army must encourage NCOs and soldiers to be innovative. In so doing, we may never get away from a "generous use of black electrician's tape," but it is after all, the soldier's ingenuity that has led to some of the infantry's greatest breakthroughs in the pursuit to "own the night."

1. Schemmer, Benjamin F., The Raid, Harper and Row, 1976, pp 101-103.